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Super Liens, FHLB Advances and the Road to Forbearance October 3, 2008 "Then faced with the worst financial crisis in a century, U.S. policymakers of the 1930s deliberately enacted a set of reforms that included central bank restructuring, bank regulatory reforms, federal deposit insurance, and a separate, politically accountable, publicly funded rescue mechanism, the RFC. Those policymakers paid careful attention to statutory and institutional structures that separated the fiscal policy operations of the debt rescue mechanism, the RFC, from the monetary policy operations of the central bank, which then were dominated by the Federal Reserve's discount window." Walker F. Todd
"Just wanted to drop you a line and let you know how much I enjoy your insightful and sober commentary… I am particularly impressed with your prediction this past Spring that the only issue in November's election would be the economy. Nice call! I have many friends and colleagues who ask me 'What the hell is going on?' I simply refer them to your website." Meanwhile in Washington and on the Big Media, the crisis continues. It appears that the Congress is being stampeded into meaningless action by the team of "Paulson and Poodle," the descriptive that another IRA reader assigns to Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke. The same reader takes issue with description of the Democratic presidential ticket as socialist: "How could any successor government be more statist/intrusive than what Paulson-Bernanke have done and are now proposing? Take a look at the revulsion expressed in the blogs following Bernanke's spilling the beans over what they are really up to: a massive transfer of wealth from taxpayers to shareholders and CEOs of financial institutions." Good question. We don't believe that
any action taken in Washington can prevent a serious recession in 2009-2010.
Even were authorities in the US and EU act to take our advice and immediately provide a facility to bolster bank capital positions and embrace open-bank assistance a la the WB sale, the reduction of available credit to the real economy will continue and recession will become full blown economic slump, not only in the US but around the world. Our fear is that once this badly flawed legislation is in place, the markets will refocus on the deteriorating economic fundamentals not addressed by this plan - like yesterday's job numbers. But as we said at the top of this comment, the fact of an auction for WB is very positive news. We continue to believe that the proposal
to increase deposit insurance coverage without a) making the banking industry
increase premiums and 2) removing the emergency support for toxic-waste polluted
money market funds, will cause instability in other parts of the financial
system. But it is important to note that as of Q2 2008, most of the banking
industry was actually doing fine. The vast majority of US banks are at or below the average 1.4 value of the IRA Banking Stress Index (a higher value equals greater stress). While we expect to see more bank units pushed higher as the average also climbs in Q3 2008, the bulk of the industry is likely to remain well-below the average stress level. A breakdown of the industry is shown below. Subscribers to the IRA Bank Monitor may display the index values for individual institutions.
Source: FDIC/The IRA Bank Monitor Hopefully everyone now understands the difference between a bank and a bank holding company, but this realization is making it near impossible for even solvent banks to raise capital - much less commercial firms that were dependent upon commercial paper. Thus our view that the Treasury must eventually embrace some type of capital facility to allow solvent banks to raise new equity capital -- or inevitably head down the road to forbearance for insolvent banks as was the case with the zombie S&Ls in the 1980s. Just the existence of $200-300 billion in authority for banks to sell preferred equity to the Treasury would, in our view, immediately stabilize the interbank credit markets. As long as bank counterparties believe that solvency issues exist among their peers, the market for everything from short-term interbank lending to swaps will remain gridlocked. The asset purchase program just approved by the Senate does nothing to address the issue of solvency. The Wasington Mutual and WB transactions were brilliantly executed by the FDIC, OTS and OCC. In each case, the confidentiality and integrity of the bidding and sale process was maintained. Moreover, the degree of cooperation between the agencies was exemplary. What a shame that the competence and sense of purpose displayed by the professional staff of these agencies is not reflected by the political appointees at Treasury and the Federal Reserve. Yet this loss event has effectively closed the market for private bank capital. Banks, solvent or not, are being squeezed into illiquidity. As we noted in our last comment, in the takeover of Washington Mutual Bank the $58.4 billion in advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank outstanding as of June 30, 2008, was conveyed through the receivership into the newco that was eventually sold to JPMorgan Chase (NYSE:JPM). The covered bonds issued by the bank unit were also conveyed into the newly chartered bank. In our view, this is significant for several reasons. First, the resolution of Washington Mutual Bank and the bankruptcy of WMI, as with Countrywide, again illustrates the fact that the obligations of the bank unit, whether institutional counterparty positions, covered bonds or FHLB advances, are all senior to the parent company creditors. Now you understand why we have dwelled so long on the example of Countrywide Financial vs. Countrywide Bank FSB. If you are taking risk exposure on a bank, be "in the bank." Second and more ominous is what the Washington Mutual and WB Bank resolutions imply for the future solvency of the largest GSE, namely the FHLBs. Both Washington Mutual Bank and Wachovia Bank have significant FHLB advances, which are collateralized with various types of relatively high-quality mortgage paper. Indeed, just about every bank resolved so far this year was a significant user of FHLB advances. The FHLBs have a "super lien" agains the assets of a failed institution. To protect their position as creditor, they have a claim on any of the additional eligible collateral in the failed bank. In addition, the FDIC has a regulation that reaffirms the FHLBs priority and the FHLBs can demand prepayment of advances when institutions fail. But this arrangement is under growing scrutiny by federal regulators. As the FDIC notes in a 2003 statement by the Advisory Committee on Banking Policy: "The FDIC has identified five problems with the current resolution process involving FHLB advances. First, prepayment fees increase loss to uninsured depositors and the deposit insurance fund… Second, the process can create resolution delays. Third, the process gives FHLBs a preferred status that no other secured creditor receives, including the Federal Reserve Banks. Fourth, it is inconsistent with depositor preference priorities established in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). Finally, it is not necessary to protect FHLBs from credit risk or any other investment risk as the FDIC repays advances with principal and interest almost immediately at failure." In the wake of the Washington Mutual resolution, we've heard from several people in the bank regulatory community that as losses from bank resolutions mount, pressure is going to grow on the FDIC to tell the FHLBs to simply keep the collateral provided by a bank rather than pay the FHLB's back at par upon resolution. Remember, most of the losses of failed banks to date have not come from paying out insured depositors, but from assets retained by the FDIC after a resolution. But that may not be the case much longer, especially with the Congress preparing to raise the insured limit on FDIC cover without raising insurance premiums. It is wrong to say that the banking industry has opposed increasing the limit on FDIC insurance; they just did not want to pay for it through higher premiums. But now they may have no choice. "The increase in the deposit insurance cap without increasing premiums is going to justify the FDIC going to Treasury to ask for further reserves," notes one prominent observer close to the regulatory community. "The proposed increase in deposit insurance coverage in the bailout legislation necessitates a move by the FDIC to change the relationship with the federal home loan banks. It is essential for the FDIC to be able to act promptly in order to resolve failed institutions with all due haste, otherwise we go down the road to forbearance." In the event that the FDIC changes policy and tells the FHLBs to keep the collateral, then the largest GSE could be forced to attempt to sell that high-quality collateral backing advances into an illiquid market. As and when that day comes, the phones on the desks of the Treasury Secretary and Fed Chairman Bernanke (assuming he is still in office) are going to ring and the next GSE bailout will get underway. Questions? Comments? info@institutionalriskanalytics.comAbout IRA Products and Services IRA offers advanced analytics for risk surveillance and investment research via subscription products such as the IRA Bank Monitor for Professionals covering the US banking industry and the IRA Corporate Monitor covering public companies. For a trial subscription or an on-line demonstration, please register here. IRA Advisory Services including our channel research and diligence support services are available to qualified clients. For more information, please contact our offices. IRA for ConsumersIRA provides consumers easy to buy online reports to independently check on their banks via our How's My Bank? system. IRA on Web 2.0For updates during the week please follow IRA www.twitter.com/IRABankMonitor. The Institutional Risk Analyst is published by Lord, Whalen LLC (LW) and may not be reproduced, disseminated, or distributed, in part or in whole, by any means, outside of the recipient's organization without express written authorization from LW. It is a violation of federal copyright law to reproduce all or part of this publication or its contents by any means. This material does not constitute a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any securities or investments. The opinions expressed herein are based on publicly available information and are considered reliable. However, LW makes NO WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY SORT with respect to this report. Any person using this material does so solely at their own risk and LW and/or its employees shall be under no liability whatsoever in any respect thereof. |
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